What DRAP taught us about the impact of workforce adjustment (WFA) - and why it matters now
- Betsy Thomas

- 5 days ago
- 12 min read
How cuts are carried out can shape the effectiveness, culture, and capacity of the public service for years
Context
The Deficit Reduction Action Plan (DRAP) was a federal government initiative launched in 2012 to reduce operating costs across departments and agencies in order to meet fiscal restraint objectives.
Organizations were required to identify savings, streamline operations, and, in many cases, reduce or reorganize their workforce.
While the stated target was a reduction of 19,200 positions, estimates suggest that between 29,000 and 35,000 public service roles were eliminated by 2015. DRAP affected thousands of public servants—some
directly, others indirectly through workload changes, reorganizations, and freezes in staffing and promotions.
Today’s budget reductions (2025–2028) aim to decrease the federal public service from 357,965 to approximately 330,000 employees. As one of the largest restructuring efforts in recent decades, DRAP
remains a critical reference point for understanding how large-scale workforce reductions affect people, programs, and institutions.
To understand how DRAP impacted the public service and what lessons could benefit the public service today, we interviewed and corresponded with public servants who directly experienced DRAP and
analyzed hundreds of social media posts in public service forums. These stories offer a clear set of recommendations for the current round of budget cuts.
When federal budgets tighten, it is easy to focus on numbers: how many roles, how much savings, and how quickly departments can reorganize. The experiences shared by public servants who lived through DRAP show that how cuts are carried out can shape the effectiveness, culture, and capacity of the public service for years afterward.
Findings
What We Can Learn from DRAP to Make the Current Budget Cuts Go More Smoothly
Across all accounts of lived experience, a clear and consistent set of lessons emerges. These insights highlight what harmed people during DRAP, as well as the practices that provided stability, clarity, fairness, and humanity. Together, they point to concrete actions that can make the current reductions less
traumatic and more effective for employees, managers, and the system.
It is important to note here that some perceive morale in the public service to be even lower than what it was during DRAP, and comparisons with that time suggest that current conditions feel more constrained, risking worse outcomes than in previous periods of workforce reduction.

Budget Cuts Are Not Inherently Undesirable — But They Must Be Strategic
Interviewees made it clear that they did not oppose budget cuts outright. They felt reductions could be productive, responsible, and necessary if handled with strategic intent, good planning, and a clear understanding of what work should continue.
Without adequate planning, there is a broader public impact. When internal processes falter, it is possible that Canadians could experience slower service, reduced capacity, and inconsistent program delivery. The credibility of government suff ers when institutions appear weakened or mistakes seem
preventable. Cuts that are poorly implemented can unintentionally reduce the government’s ability to deliver on its priorities and maintain public confidence.
The stories from DRAP show that the risk is not only cutting too deeply—it is cutting without intention, communication, or humanity. The costs are measured not only in dollars, but in trust, talent, and long-term effectiveness.
Two suggestions emerged for implementing cuts more strategically:
Cuts should start with a clear analysis of what work must stop—not just who must go
Employees witnessed:
Cuts to functions later rebuilt at signifi cant cost
Loss of specialized expertise
Backlogs and degraded services
Centralization eff orts that created new problems (e.g., Shared Services, Phoenix)
Decisions perceived as politically motivated rather than evidence-based
In contrast, clear planning and governance reduced ineffi ciencies. In several large departments, structured planning committees analyzed workload, demographics, and operational impacts. Where evidence was used—such as modelling the service consequences of reductions—leadership made more informed choices.
Implication for today:
Cuts must be tied to analysis of what work should be continued or discontinued, not a generalized “effi ciency” narrative. Services and expertise must not be unintentionally hollowed out.
DRAP revealed opportunities for renewal—under the right conditions
Some participants viewed DRAP as a moment where:
Employees restarted stalled careers
Outdated or stagnant functions were downsized
Individuals close to retirement or those who wanted to leave the public service used alternation to leave on their own terms
These outcomes occurred only where planning was strategic, communication was forthright, and leadership treated the process as both a human and organizational exercise—not merely a budget exercise.
Where institutional knowledge was lost abruptly, gaps took years to repair. Remaining employees faced increased workload pressure, burnout, and declining morale. In some cases, organizations later paid to replace lost expertise through consultants or emergency staffi ng.
Implication for today:
Cuts can support renewal, but only when grounded in analysis, transparency, and respect, and rooted in a vision for how the workforce supports program and service delivery
Communicate Early, Honestly, and Often
A universal lesson is that uncertainty caused more harm than the cuts themselves. Interviewees described:
Long waits between verbal notice and offi cial letters
Silence from leadership while rumours spread
Contradictory or heavily scripted communication
Reassurances such as “it’s a win-win,” which only served to deepen a sense of fear
What employees wanted was:
Plain-language explanations of what cuts meant
Clear timelines
Consistency across leadership levels
Authentic conversations rather than talking points
Employees were more resilient when they understood what was happening, why it was happening, and what options were available.
Implication for today:
Leadership must communicate in a timely manner with clarity and sincerity, be transparent about uncertainty, and avoid language that minimizes the eff ect it is having upon public servants.
Reduce Prolonged Uncertainty by Making Processes Faster and Clearer
Interviewees consistently described DRAP as a prolonged period of uncertainty. People waited months for answers and were left navigating shifting scenarios with little guidance, while being expected to maintain performance in roles that might be eliminated.
When uncertainty dominates the workplace, it slows the work itself. Services back up, priorities blur, and decision-making stalls. Several public servants recalled entire areas of work “grinding to a snail’s pace” as people waited to see what would happen. Many described months of waiting between early signals, formal “affected” notices, and eventual outcomes.
This prolonged uncertainty led to:
Extreme stress
Competition and breakdown of team trust
Paralysis and loss of productivity
Feelings of powerlessness
Interviewees stressed the importance of:
Reducing waiting periods
Providing predictable steps and timelines
Avoiding performative competitions for roles already informally decided
Giving employees concrete actions they could take
Implication for today:
Make the process shorter, simpler, and more predictable wherever possible. A common suggestion from contributors was to reduce rumour and stigma by notifying everyone at the same time, clearly indicating who is aff ected and who is not.
Recognize that people may need time to process what is happening and modify expectations accordingly.
Leadership
One of the strongest fi ndings is that the experience of DRAP varied dramatically depending on the quality of leadership.
Strong leadership made a meaningful diff erence. Some leaders communicated openly, acknowledging the uncertainty of this diffi cult time, and treated employees with dignity. In these environments, senior leaders were visible and took responsibility for decisions. Public servants described these workplaces as organized, predictable, and human.
Other leaders avoided diffi cult conversations, relied on scripts, or downplayed concerns. Where leadership fell short, trust eroded quickly. If today’s cuts are handled similarly—without visible leadership, clear information, and genuine care—employees will feel abandoned, and the damage to organizational culture will be long-lasting.
During the current round of budget cuts, employees want leaders to:
Show up early and regularly
Speak plainly
Explain decisions directly
Honour people’s service
Take responsibility for rebuilding trust
Implication for today:
Leadership capability is the diff erentiator between a humane and an inhumane process.
Provide Real Support to Managers Who Must Deliver Diffi cult News
Managers - especially those who were new or unprepared - described signifi cant challenges during DRAP:
Feeling abandoned by HR
Limited understanding of Workforce Adjustment (WFA) Policy, Directives, and their implementation
No preparation for emotionally charged conversations
Delivering life-altering news without guidance
Some report learning of impacts at the same time as staff , indicating limited advance information across all levels
This led to harmful interactions, misunderstandings, and confl ict, including with unions.
Interviewees emphasized that managers need:
Training in WFA mechanics
Help developing honest, supportive communications
Emotional intelligence tools
Opportunities to practice diffi cult conversations
Ongoing check-ins
Implication for today:
If managers are not supported, employees will suff er—and organizational trust will erode.
Treat Workforce Adjustment as a Human Experience, Not Just an Administrative Process
Employees described DRAP as emotionally taxing and, in some cases, traumatic. Poor communication, inconsistent messaging, and performative competitions created fear and mistrust. When people feel disrespected or uninformed, they disengage and stop taking risks. This cultural damage lingered long after staffing stabilized.
Participants described:
Anxiety, grief, and stigma associated with being “aff ected”
Sleeplessness, illness, and trauma
Guilt at not being aff ected, when so many others are
Long-term impacts on identity and confi dence
Emotional strain on managers delivering diffi cult news
Employees said they needed:
Leaders trained in human-centred, trauma-informed communication
Acknowledgment of emotional realities
Psychological safety
Managers who could listen without defensiveness or platitudes
Interviewees noted that there are eff orts to begin to address this in programming for leaders in the public service.
Implication for today:
Leadership that is more people-centred and empathetic must be an explicit pillar of the budget reduction process.
Ensure Fair, Consistent, and Equitable Access to WFA Tools
Tools such as alternation, priority placement, education allowances, salary protection, and early retirement mechanisms helped many employees avoid unemployment and pursue new paths. They supported:
Employment continuity
Better role alignment
More humane workforce reshaping
Some noted the value in the time that WFA provides to plan, rather than immediate job loss.
However, access to these tools was inconsistent:
Some departments actively shared alternation options; others did not
Some managers actively supported some employees
Priority placement support varied widely
Currently, in online forums, public servants are having to seek clarification from peers and rely on others’ lived experience to interpret notices, timelines, and options, for example:
What an “affected” letter means
The difference between “affected” and “surplus”
How WFA timelines work
What options realistically lead to continued employment
Fairness depends on:
Equal access to information and tools
Consistent application of rules
Removal of bias
Honest use of performance data to make useful decisions about what work to continue rather than get rid of those perceived to be ”poor performers”
Positive experiences occurred when tools were:
Explained clearly in plain language
Used early
Applied consistently and fairly without bias
Encouraged systematically
Implication for today:
Ensure access to information and tools across the public service and offer options early and transparently. Standardizing is one way to do this. Also, providing clearer guidance on career planning, mobility, and realistic outcomes would be helpful.
Protect Equity, Innovation, and Early-Career Talent
During DRAP, early-career employees, students, and administrative staff were disproportionately affected. Many lost pathways into permanent roles, while others experienced stalled progression.The impact to the organization was that there were gaps later on.
Interviewees observed:
Disproportionate impacts on administrative, junior, and female-dominated roles
Elimination of innovation and engagement units
Loss of early-career pipelines
Departure of specialized expertise
Heavier cultural and psychological burdens on some communities
They emphasized the need to:
Apply GBA+ meaningfully
Protect early-career talent
Safeguard innovation
Preserve institutional memory
Evaluate impacts on marginalized groups explicitly
Implication for today:
Cuts must not worsen inequities or weaken the future capacity of the public service by gutting it of emerging talent and leadership.
Build Structured Debriefs, Healing, and Learning into the Process
After DRAP, no structured review or learning process occurred. Teams received little support to rebuild trust and effectiveness, and lessons were not systematically captured.
Interviewees recommended:
Team-level debriefs
Opportunities to honour contributions of those who were leaving
Spaces to process grief and stress
System-wide learning after major reduction phases
Capturing employee experiences for future cycles
Conclusion
Today’s workforce reductions offer a choice: repeat the patterns of the past or apply the lessons learned. Public servants have been clear about what makes the difference - honest communication, strong leadership, fair access to transition tools, and dignity throughout the process.
These conditions support a public service that can adapt responsibly without causing avoidable harm to its people or long-term capacity. If they are ignored, the consequences will reverberate long after fiscal objectives are met.
Change will only be successful if leaders and organizations address the transition that people experience during change. Supporting people through transition, rather than pushing forward, is essential if change is to work as planned. This is key to capitalizing on opportunities for innovation and building organizational resilience. (William Bridges

Methodology
This report was researched through individual interviews with current and former public servants, personal communications with public servants, and from analyzing hundreds of personal stories and observations in social media forums composed of public servants.
All interviews were transcribed and then coded using AI. The data was grouped and regrouped several times, using multiple interrogations and approaches. Several integrated documents were created using AI, and then integrated again by the researchers.
Individuals contributed their experiences, insights, and recommendations to this report through interviews and personal communications. They represent a variety of positions and levels in the public service across various departments. Some were impacted by DRAP personally, and many more were were witnesses to what happened within their departments and teams over the short and long terms.
There was clear consensus by those both affected and unaffected as to recommendations for improving the current round of budget cuts in the Federal Public Service.
The final report was produced by human researchers with some editing help from AI.
Recommendations
Start With the Work, Not the People
Base decisions on a clear analysis of what work should stop, continue, or change—before Protect critical expertise and avoid hollowing out services that will later need to be rebuilt at higher cost.
Treat Workforce Adjustment as Strategic and Human
Approach reductions as both organizational redesign and human transition. Cuts can support renewal only when grounded in evidence, transparency, and respect—not generic efficiency narratives.
Communicate Early, Honestly, and Often
Reduce uncertainty through plain-language communication. Share what is known, what is not, and when updates will come. Avoid scripted reassurances or language that minimizes impact.
Shorten and Clarify Processes
Make timelines and steps as predictable as possible. Reduce waiting periods, avoid performative competitions, and give people concrete actions they can take. Prolonged uncertainty causes more harm than the cuts themselves.
Invest Explicitly in Leadership Capability
Recognize leadership quality as the primary differentiator between humane and harmful outcomes. Leaders should be visible, accountable, and direct, and trained in people-centred, trauma-aware communication.
Provide Real Support to Managers
Equip managers with:
Clear understanding of WFA policies and timelines
Preparation for emotionally charged conversations
Ongoing guidance and check-ins
Unsupported managers unintentionally amplify harm and erode trust.
Ensure Access to WFA Tools
Standardize access to information and tools such as alternation, priority placement, and education allowances.
Explain options in plain language, apply rules consistently, and remove bias from decision-making.
Protect Equity, Innovation, and Early-Career Talent
Apply GBA+ meaningfully. Safeguard early-career pipelines, innovation capacity, and institutional memory. Avoid disproportionate impacts that weaken future leadership and capability.
End Reductions With Closure and Learning
Do not allow reductions to end in silence. Build in:
Team-level debriefs
Recognition of contributions
Spaces to process stress and loss
Structured capture of lessons learned
Unprocessed transitions resurface later as disengagement and cultural damage.

Final Observations
DRAP showed that workforce adjustment leaves a long shadow.
The greatest risk is not the cuts themselves, but avoidable harm caused by poor planning, weak leadership, and prolonged uncertainty.
Applying these lessons now can reduce long-term damage and support a public service that remains capable, trusted, and resilient through change.
Appendix A - Methodological Notes
This appendix is intended to clarify sources, framing, and limitations for institutional audiences. It does not introduce new evidence or claims.
Nature of the Evidence Base
Source material for this report consists of:
Interviews and correspondence with public servants who experienced DRAP
Qualitative analysis of publicly available online discussions in public-service forums
Synthesis of recurring themes across roles, departments, and time periods
Findings represent qualitative lived experience, not a statistical or causal analysis. Statements refl ect patterns observed across accounts, not universal conditions.
Use of Language Such as “Interviewees Described,” “Participants Noted,” “Employees Observed”
These phrases are used intentionally to:
Attribute claims to lived experience rather than institutional fact
Avoid over-generalization
Maintain fi delity to qualitative evidence standards
No statement is intended to assert that all departments, leaders, or processes operated in the same way.
Job-Loss Figures During DRAP
Figures cited (29,000–35,000 positions) are presented as estimates and refl ect commonly referenced ranges in public reporting and retrospective analysis. The report does not claim a defi nitive or audited count, nor does it attribute causality beyond workforce reduction activities associated with DRAP.
References to Centralization Initiatives (e.g., Phoenix, Shared Services)
Mentions of centralization initiatives are:
Presented as examples referenced by interviewees
Not positioned as a comprehensive evaluation
Not intended to assert sole or direct causation
They are included to illustrate how reductions perceived as poorly sequenced or insuffi ciently planned were experienced by employees.
Psychological and Emotional Impacts
Terms such as stress, anxiety, grief, trauma are used:
As descriptive language reported by participants
Not as clinical diagnoses
Not to imply medical conditions
The report avoids diagnostic terminology and frames impacts as subjective experience, consistent with ethical qualitative reporting.
Leadership and Managerial Findings
Statements regarding leadership quality and managerial support are:
Derived from recurring themes across accounts
Framed as correlational observations, not causal proof
Not intended to attribute fault to specifi c individuals, departments, or roles
Equity and GBA+ Observations
Equity-related observations are:
Based on participant perception and experience
Framed as indicative rather than exhaustive
Intended to fl ag risk areas for further analysis, not to conclude outcomes
Use of Change and Transition Language
Conceptual references to “change” and “transition” refl ect established organizational-change theory, including work associated with William Bridges. Where referenced, these ideas are paraphrased, not quoted, and are included to contextualize observed experiences—not to advance a theoretical argument.
Recommendations
Recommendations are:
Derived directly from lived experience and qualitative synthesis
Intended as practical considerations, not prescriptive directives
Framed to inform current practice, not to evaluate past compliance


Comments